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Croce 
Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) is perhaps the best known Italian philosopher of 
the twentieth century.  Although his influence today is most strongly felt in the 
fields of aesthetics, philosohy of history and literary criticism, his theory of art 
was merely a part of his whole philosophical system which embodied aesthetics, 
logic (conceptual knowledge), economics and ethics.   
 
As the son of wealthy landowners in the Abruzzi of Italy, Croce was born into the 
enviable position of never having to earn money in order to support his scholarly 
pursuits.  For this reason, he never held an academic teaching post although he 
did twice serve as Minister for Education for the Italian government, once in 
1920-1 and again after the Second World War.  After being injured in the 
earthquake which killed his parents, Croce spent three years in Rome before 
moving to Naples in 1886 where he lived until his death.  He had a long 
friendship with Giovanni Gentile and they collaborated together on the journal La 
critica, but their relationship finally dissolved when Croce openly criticised the 
fascist government for whom Gentile had become the official philosopher.  Croce, 
oddly enough, was tolerated by the fascist authorities, becoming the most well-
known critic of the regime and, in the eyes of the Italian people, the champion of 
liberty. 
The System of Spirit 
Croce’s whole philosophical system began from the consideration of aesthetics 
and, in particular, the problems of literature and history.  Above all, he was 
primarily fascinated by the debate over whether history was an art or a science.  
The answer he was to offer would radically revise the relationship between art 
and science by promoting art to the level of knowledge.  Life and reality were, for 
him, history and nothing but history and this “historical idealism” was an 
attempt on his part to make intelligible the Hegelian aspiration to identify what is 
rational with what is historically actual or real.  In framing and responding to his 
own question in this way, Croce aligned himself with his major influences, Vico 
and Hegel, and like them held a position counter to the prevailing ideas of the 
Enlightenment: truth is not to be described in abstract terms independent of 
history, but it is rather historical through and through.  His thought was an 
idealism because reality is constructed by the power of the knowing mind and it 
was specifically a form of Hegelian idealism because the historical rationalisation 
of reality is truth.  When one is aware of the historical process of truth, one 
recognises one’s philosophy as part of this development and this, according to 
Croce, is spirit.  Spirit is perhaps best comprehended as a harmony between the 
knowing mind and reality, when the knowing subject knows what is the case and 
why historically it is the case. 
 
The system of spirit describes the development and ascent of knowledge and is 
primarily separated into the traditional division of theoretical reason (describing 
what is) and practical reason (describing what should be).  Theoretical reason is 
either aesthetics (the cognitive experience of the particular) or logic (cognitive 
experience of the universal); whereas practical reason is divided into economics 
(practical experience concerned with the particular) and ethics (practical 
experience concerned with the universal).  Art for Croce – as it was for both Vico 
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and Hegel – is a primitive form of knowing but – unlike them – he did not believe 
it to be rational.  However, philosophy and logic are dependent on and 
determined by aesthetic expressions of reality since these supply the raw material 
from which the mind is able to conceptualise objects.  Philosophy or logic, in 
turn, supplies the language for economics or the sphere of knowledge in which 
man renders his wants, volitions and needs intelligible.  The main characteristic 
of economic practical reason is that it describes objects as useful or not in terms 
of the purposes of men.  Finally, the practical knowledge of ethics, that is the 
universal nature of volition and knowledge of good and bad independent of utility, 
is derived from the subject’s experience of the more primitive economic volitions.  
Ethics describes what is universally good independent of particular or group 
purposes.  The Good is not to be understood in terms of some universal and 
impersonal moral law because all truth is ultimately historical, the Good is 
understood in terms of the historical processes of spirit.  
 
In order to complete the circle of spirit, one would assume that our new, 
sophisticated account of the Good would feed back into our understanding of art 
and begin the progression at a higher level and, although Croce does sometimes 
seem to suggest this, at others he suggests that knowledge of the Good raises the 
knowing subject to the level of historical knowledge and truth proper.  The full 
elaboration of this progressive schema is perhaps the best way to elucidate 
Croce’s philosophy. 
Aesthetics 
The first moment of universal spirit is artistic; knowing, in short, begins with art.  
Art is the expression of intuitions, but intuition is to be understood in terms of 
Kant’s Anschauung: a manifold of experience, which is to say that, even at this 
level, the mind is active and not passive.  One can understand the artistic 
moment as the attempt on the part of the subject to fix what is real and dissect it 
from what is mere appearance, thus it is a cognitive expression and not a value 
judgement: the artist is not aiming at beauty, nor some moral judgement, but he 
is aiming at the truth of the particular (much like the expressivist artist). 
 
Art must be expressed in a particular medium, hence the divisions of poetry 
(words), plastic arts (colour, matter, et cetera) music (sounds) and so on, but all 
are equally ruled by feeling.  It is feeling in the sense of mood or emotion which 
structures the form of the image and the image which allows a feeling to be 
expressed.  The active element of a representation at this non-conceptual level is 
human spirit expressing itself in the way it structures the experience it is given.  
It is an immediate and aesthetic experience of reality.  However, to equate Croce 
with the romantic elements in Hegel’s early philosophy is to make a mistake, the 
feeling or emotion at stake is a particular manner of knowing reality for the 
subject, it is not a moment of primitive reason which needs to be overcome and 
reified as Hegel held.  Artistic expression is the a priori synthesis of feeling and 
representation and it is equally an immediate, vital and non-conceptual 
awareness of knowing what is real. 
 
Croce also departed from Hegel’s influence in one other major way: the realms of 
expression and reason are distinct, and the dialectic of the distincts is not one of 
opposition (as it was for Hegel in which art would be overcome by more reified 
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ways of knowing such as religion).  Intuition is distinct from pure concepts, much 
as in Kant the faculty of intuition is distinct from the faculty of understanding, 
rather than an opposition that can be resolved. The concepts of reason require 
intuitions as raw material from which to form objects; but aesthetics, when 
concerned with beauty, requires the pure concepts of logic.  The dialectic operates 
between the borders set by the knowledge of pure intuition (aesthetics) and the 
knowledge of pure concept (logic). 
Logic 
From the particular expressions with which the knowing subject represents the 
world aesthetically, one can abstract general concepts which can then be used in 
science and other realms of knowledge.  Although the human being’s faculty of 
logic is separate from his faculty of intuition or immediate experience, the former 
is incapable of operation without the material supplied by the latter.  The central 
and most controversial claim of Croce’s philosophy of knowledge was the 
identification of truth with history, although this thesis was already well known 
to Hegelians.  Logic is defined as the knowledge of the universal which uses the 
particular knowledge of intuitions to form objective truth.  Croce held that since 
any philosophical assertion is made by a subject and that subject exists 
concretely and historically and not as some abstract entity, then the assertion 
itself must be historical: when I say, “My laptop is on” the truth of this statement 
can be established because it is a matter of historical fact.   
 
The awareness of the historical nature of concepts, that is their relationship to 
the development of spirit, brings the subject to a new kind of knowledge, that is, 
spirit itself.  However, art was not a primitive form of reason but the faculty of 
intuition, that is, the way in which the subject immediately apprehends the 
world.  Logic, then, is the faculty of understanding and the categories which 
determine the truth of the subject’s conceptual objects are not abstract 
universals but the categories of historical knowledge which determine the four 
ways in which one can evaluate statements: intuitively, rationally, economically 
and morally. 
 
Croce dismissed the idea of abstract universals in knowledge because they were, 
according to him, always in the service of some deeper practical aim.  Error arises 
due to the confusion of pseudo-concepts for concepts proper.  A pseudo-concepts 
such as egoism in economic systems of explanation, does not describe some 
universal aspect of human nature.  Egoism is true of men only in so far as we are 
interested in predicting the effect of market forces and regulations on a country’s 
economy.  Croce does not deny the practical applicability of pseudo-concepts but 
he maintains that, in the final instance, one is mistaken when one raises them to 
the level of truth when they are more properly conceived in pragmatic terms.  The 
evaluation of pseudo-concepts in terms of utility is not dissimilar to the Marxist 
critique of ethics: what is good depends on deeper structures, viz. economics.  
What is true in science depends on deeper structures and aims: our scientific 
concepts often change in tune with our practical, historical aims.  Truth, for 




Economics covers the sphere of the operations of practical reason concerned with 
the matter of the individual: his needs, desires and volitions.  Any concept 
employed in the satisfaction of these needs would of course be a pseudo-concept 
which could not be universalised.  Economic operations presuppose the 
immediate knowing of the world present in aesthetic experience as well as the 
conceptual knowledge of logic. 
 
Controversially for an idealist, Croce locates politics and law within the realm of 
economics: what is legally right is what is useful; law is essentially amoral.  The 
state, for Croce, is nothing but a process of purposive actions by a group of 
individuals or within the group of individuals and laws are adopted in order to 
bring about these useful ends.  He saw politics as the dialectical struggle between 
the distinct entities of power and consent as well as authority and liberty; a view 
which is hardly surprising given the fascist structure of Italy which he 
experienced.   
 
Morality could play no part in politics because the moral life of the individual is 
not geared towards the useful.  Croce here follows Machiavelli rather than Hegel 
and his rather odd brand of liberalism can perhaps be understood as descending 
from his compatriot rather than the ethico-political holism of the German.  In 
many ways, he was a liberal by default since difference, individuality and 
tolerance were necessary for his dialectic of the distincts and liberalism was the 
only way to secure these values.  As far as the democratic ideals of fraternity, 
liberty and equality were concerned, he viewed them as pseudo-concepts rather 
than moral ideals; that is, concepts useful for attaining an end rather than 
prescribing or describing universal values.  
Ethics 
In the sphere of economic practical reason, Croce reduces all goods or concepts to 
pragmatism: they are useful in so far as they bring about the end aimed at by the 
agent.  However, usefulness as a value only makes sense if there is some good or 
end aimed at, which the science of economics cannot evaluate or supply.  It is for 
this reason that ethics occupies the highest echelon of Croce’s system: it gives us 
universal knowledge of the Good so that we can aim at it.  However, Croce was 
more Machiavellian than Hegelian: he did not see that the moral life could lead to 
the ethical whole of the state and that law was ultimately economic and not 
moral.  So what is the nature of the Good that ethics makes possible? 
 
The moral point of view is when the economic interests of the agent are trumped 
by some supreme value which obliges him to act in accordance with it rather 
than pragmatism.  The only origin of such a value is not the Hegelian ethical 
state, nor the Kantian moral law, but spirit understood as historical experience.  
One sees Good is the progress of spirit to ever more adequate ways of 
understanding the world and the truth of a political state can only be experienced 
historically by the progress of spirit.  Thus, Croce seems to be committed to at 
least a minimal conservatism: one can only evaluate the actions of men in terms 
of the progress of history and not from some universal, moral standpoint. 
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Croce’s philosophy often suffers by being understood as a derivative of Hegelian 
idealism, an accusation which is unjust given the obvious differences listed 
above.  Croce combined elements from Hegel with Vico, but also Kant and his 
own original insights, in order to produce a unique form of historical idealism 
which is much more than a mere theory of aesthetics. 
 
The complete works of Croce are available in Italian and the works have been 
translated separately into English.  The major philosophical ideas can be found in 
Aesthetic (Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale, 1902), 
Logic (Logica come scienza del concetto puro, 1902) and Philosophy of the Practical 
(Filosofia della pratica, economia ed etica, 1909). 
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